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RECENT DECISIONS
protection is granted. The license to publish, however, does not become
absolute because this discussion is within the favored sphere. Freedom
of speech and the right to defame will then be tempered to the extent a
balance is achieved between public and private interests.
It is submitted that because the elements and methods of analysis
which form the basis of the constitutional approach to privilege are sub-
stantially the same as those used by the tort approach, the privileges re-
quired by the Constitution should correspond to those which have been
developed through tort law. The instant case, by extending the freedoms
guaranteed by the first amendment, has created a new foundation upon
which an extensive body of privileges may be built.39
BRUCE L. ENNIS.
LEGAL AID PLANS OF LABOR UNIONS ARE AN EXERCISE OF FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND Do NOT CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ETHICS.-The
defendant labor union operated a Legal Aid Department whereby union
representatives and investigators advised injured union members to
retain a particular attorney. The representatives and investigators
occasionally carried blank contracts of employment and photos of settle-
ment checks from previous lawsuits to persuade injured members to en-
gage the attorney. The attorney's contingent fee was set by the union and
from it the attorney paid for the investigative services performed by the
union.1 The Montana Bar Association charged the union and several non-
resident attorneys with a conspiracy to engage in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law in Montana. The trial court enjoined defendant union from
fee fixing, practicing law and soliciting claims. Defendant lawyers and
their agents were enjoined from soliciting. Plaintiff alleged in part that
the decree rendered in the trial court was inadequate because it allowed
defendant union to continue investigating claims and recommending law-
" November 23, 1964, the Supreme Court handed down a sequel to the instant case.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 4019 (1964). Appellant, the District
Attorney of Orleans Parish allegedly defamed eight judges of the criminal district
court of the parish. He was convicted of criminal defamation. The court over-
turned the Louisiana decision, applying the same standard to criminal libel prosecu-
tions as applied to civil action in the instant case. It said "only those false state-
ments made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded
by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions." Gar-
rison v. State of Louisiana, supra at 4022.
In the Garrison case the Court recognized for the first time that deliberate false-
hood may be used as an effective political tool. However, this issue was passed over
summarily as the Court indicated that their limitation of the right to comment by
''actual malice"I would take care of any such problems. See notes 12 and 20, supra.
'The court did not state the facts in the instant case but said they were essentially
the same as in Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508
(1950); Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (1952); In re Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958). The statement
of facts here is composed from facts common to those three cases. The activities of
the union as described will hereinafter be referred to as the "plan."
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yers. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, dismissed. The
United States Supreme Court recently approved similar activities of the
union and its Legal Aid Department.2 In view of that decision, the decree
of the district court unduly limited the union's activities in this area.
Ryan and Berg v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 396 P.2d 113 (Mont.
1964) .3
The first amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
freedom of speech and assembly. A state may not limit these rights with-
out showing a "substantial regulatory interest"'4 or a "clear and present
danger"5 to public welfare. In BRT v. Virginia,6 the Supreme Court held
that a substantial regulatory interest was not present to justify the
limitations imposed by the state on the activities described in the instant
case. The Court reasoned that first amendment freedoms included the
freedom of union members to discuss their rights under the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act. A corollary of this right was the power to select
spokesmen to give advice about legal assistance and direct prospective
litigants to counsel. The Court said:
Here what Virginia has sought to halt is not a commercialization
of the legal profession which might threaten the moral and
ethical fabric of the administration of justice. It is not "ambu-
lance chasing." The railroad workers, by recommending compe-
tent lawyers to each other, obviously are not themselves engaging
in the practice of law, nor are they or the lawyers whom they
select parties to any solicitation of business.7
The Court found, in effect, that the plan did not conflict with Canons
27 and 28 of the American Bar Association prohibiting solicitation.'
2Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 84 S.Ct. 1113 (1964),
hereinafter referred to as BRT v. Virginia.
sPlaintiff 's petition for rehearing, on the grounds that the instant case is distinguish-
able on its facts from that decided by the United States Supreme Court, is now
pending.
'NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963).
5Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1944).
I'Supra note 2.
7BRT v. Virginia, supra note 2, at 1117. This language may be compared to that
of the Tennessee Supreme Court which summarized Doughty v. Grills, supra note 1,
as follows: "There was an original bill for an injunction brought by the officials
of the State Bar Association against ambulance chasers corraling legal claims against
the railroads through representatives of a union." Moore v. Mitchell, 205 Tenn.
591, 329 S.W.2d 821, 822 (1959).
'The canons of ethics are accepted standards of conduct for the Bar and are widely
followed, although they do not have the force of statute unless adopted as such.
In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495, 55 A.L.R. 1309 (1928); McCracken,
Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37 VA. L. REV.
399 (1951). ABA, CANONS OF PROF. ETHICS, Canon 27 provides in part: "It is un-
professional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through
touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal rela-
tions." Canon 28 in part: "It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to
bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make
it his duty to do so." Solicitation is also prohibited by statute. See, REVISED CODES
OF MONTAA, 1947, §§ 93-2108 and 94-35-209.
[Vol. 26,
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It ignored the conflict between the plan and Canon 35 forbidding the
presence of a lay intermediary between attorney and client.9
In 1930, the Brotherhood adopted a legal aid plan which sought to
secure adequate recoveries for its injured members. 10 Under this plan,
the United States was divided into sixteen regions, following either geo-
graphic or railroad lines. A law firm in each region was selected by the
Brotherhood to handle claims as they arose." This plan was subject to
sporadic litigation after 1930, and underwent a number of changes under
judicial pressure. 1 2 It took its present form in 1959 pursuant to a decree
of the Illinois Supreme Court.' 3 The Illinois court stated that the plan
did not violate the prohibition against solicitation if union activity were
limited to:
1. Maintaining an investigative staff, employed and paid by the
Legal Aid Department of the union;
2. Conducting investigations so that their results were of maximum
value to members in prosecuting claims;
3. Forwarding information from the investigations to injured mem-
bers; and,
4. Supplying names of attorneys capable, in its opinion, of handling
claims successfully.' 4
However, the court forbade the union from the following:
1. Allowing its employees to carry blank contracts for employment
of regional counsel and photos of settlement checks;
0Canon 35 provides in part:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer .... Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent are not deemed
such intermediaries .... A lawyer may accept employment from any organiza-
tion, such as an association, club or trade organization, to render legal services
in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this
employment should not include the rendering of legal services to the members
of such an organization in respect to their individual affairs.
This canon has not been observed as closely as the others. McCracken, supra
note 8, and has been criticized as archaic, Weihofen, Practice of Law by Non-
Pecuniary Corporations: A Social Utility, 2 U. CHi. L. REv. 119 (1934).
"The railroads were often successful in gaining "cheap settlements" of claims. BRT
v. Virginia, supra note 2, at 1115.
"Montana was in the region assigned to a Minneapolis firm.
"See, for example, In re O'Neill, 5 F.Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933).
1In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, supra note 1. The plan in Montana
differed considerably from the form approved in Illinois because the Montana case
was brought in 1958. The Brotherhood later conformed its national program to
the requirements of the Illinois decree. Hecker, Hulse v. Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen . . . Corrected Abuse? 28 U.P. NEws 136 (1962).
"The Illinois court approved these elements of the plan because it felt that the Brother-
hood had a legitimate interest in investigating physical injuries sustained by its
members. The court did not explain the nature of this interest, but implicit in its
opinion is acceptance of the Brotherhood's argument that the hazardous nature of
railroading and the faculty of railroad agents to force settlement of claims on union
'iembers for small sums made a\legal aid plan adviseable.
1964]
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2. Having any financial connection with counsel; and,
3. Fixing fees for counsel's employment.
Moreover, regional counsel were forbidden from paying any gratuity to
"tipsters" and investigators for procuring cases. The Illinois court thus
condemned those activities most blatantly violative of the traditional
professional prohibitions against solicitation and the presence of a lay
intermediary.
Solicitation has long been prohibited because of its tendency to
commercialize the profession. 15 The presence of a lay intermediary has
been prohibited because of the likelihood of conflicts between the duties
owed the client and those owed the interniediary.' 6 These prohibitions
are not founded upon fears of solicitation nor upon the presence of a
lay intermediary as such, but on the consequences which may follow.
Because of these traditional considerations, courts previously condemned
the Brotherhood's 17 and similar plans. Is Nonetheless, such programs
occasionally received court and Bar approval. 19 Though they may have
differed in form, the plans did not differ in principle. The courts re-
jecting as well as those accepting plans have generally attempted to
categorize them on the pragmatic ground of whether they would frus-
trate the policy considerations underlying the prohibitions of solicitation
and the presence of a lay intermediary. 0
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in
"SBarton v. State Bar California, 209 Cal. 677, 289 Pac. 818 (1930); DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 211 (1953).
"6Informative Opinion of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice, 36 A.B.A.J. 677
(1950).
"7Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1956) (dictum);
State v. Lush, 170 Neb. 376, 103 N.W.2d 136 (1960); Hulse v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1960); Doughty v. Grills, supra note 1;
Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, supra note 1.
"See, e.g., Rhode Island Bar Ass'n. v. Automobile Service Ass'a., 55 R.I. 122, 179
Atl. 139, 100 A.L.R. 226 (1935), where defendant auto club employed an attorney to
give free legal advice to its members; People ex rel Courtney v. Ass'n. of Real Estate
Taxpayers of Illinois, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933), where defendant association
obtained low cost legal aid in real estate tax suits involving its members; People
ex rel Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935),
where defendant club employed attorneys to give free legal advice to its members;
People ex rel Lawyers Institute of San Diego v. Merchant's Protective Corp., 189
Cal. 1531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922), where defendant corporation employed attorneys
to advise members on new laws.
"See, e.g., Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n., 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602, 132 A.L.R. 1165
(1940), where lawyers advertised free legal advice to victims of usury; AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEv-
ANCES 209 (1957), where a lawyer was retained by a corporation which solicited
insurance claims; Id. 341, where a manufacturer's association retained a lawyer to
advise members on new developments in the law. See also Canon 35, supra note 9.
2A plan for legal aid to the indigent, for example, is socially desirable in promoting
equality. Moreover, as it is not particularly lucrative, it does not lead to a competitive
scramble for cases. On the other hand, a plan for the prosecution of personal injury
suits is likely to be so profitable to attorneys that they compete for cases. Commer-
cialization of the profession may result.
[Vol. 26,
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NAACP v. Button.21 The case involved a legal aid plan for the litigation
of school integration problems. The NAACP solicited cases and acted as a
lay intermediary between the lawyer and the individual in whose name
the suit was brought. The Court, however, found this practice unobjection-
able. It did not contravene the policy considerations outlined above.
But, more important, it was a form of political expression and thus pro-
tected by the first amendment.
With the application of the Constitution, the Court implied that
categorization of plans into those which threatened to commercialize the
profession and those which did not was no longer an adequate criterion.
The implication became explicit when the Court approved the Brother-
hood's plan in BRT v. Virginia.2 2 In that case the Court ignored the possi-
bility of distinguishing the plan on the ground that it served private
ends rather than political objectives as did the plan involved in the
NAACP decision.
23
When it approved the Brotherhood's plan, the Court limited the pro-
hibition of Canon 35 to cases of clear conflicts of interests. The Brother-
hood did not interfere in the actual disposition of the claim.24 As it was
interested only in obtaining competent counsel for its members and as its
pecuniary interest in operating the Legal Aid Department was probably
de minimis,25 there was no conflict between the Brotherhood and its in-
jured members. Rather, the union's reward for its services was in induce-
ment to membership and in gains in morale among workers. Neither of
these inducements present any conflict of interest between the union and
injured claimants.
Regional investigators, the lay intermediaries physically present be-
tween lawyer and client, performed the necessary function of investiga-
tion. Even when "investigation" was only a euphemism for solicitation,
it was done for the attorney, not for the Brotherhood. Thus, although
the Brotherhood plan, like that of the NAACP, contravened Canon 35, it
did not violate the policy on which the canon was based.
It is submitted that a more serious objection can be made to the
Brotherhood's plan on the grounds of solicitation. In Hildebrand v. State
Bar of California, it was said:
There is little question from the record but that petitioners
knew exactly how their professional employment by injured rail-
zSupra note 4. The NAACP activities were prohibited by VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74,
54-78 and 54-79 (Supp. 1956). There was some evidence that the statutes were aimed
at NAACP activities and not those of other groups. Supra note 4, at 445 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
'Supra note 2.
"No guaranteed civil right is involved. Here, the question involves solely the regula-
tion of the profession, a power long recognized as belonging peculiarly to the State."
BRT v. Virginia, supra note 2, at 1119 (Clarke, J., dissenting).
uHulse v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, supra note 13.
1Ibid
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road men was being solicited for them through the Brother-
hood's activities, and they were willing to perform the desired
legal services at a substantially reduced contingent fee rate in
the belief that the volume of business to be directed to them
through such solicitation would warrant such financial considera-
tion.
26
To this argument, the United States Supreme Court replied that it was
not a vice for one union member to advise another to engage a particular
lawyer. Stated in that language the argument of the Court is not subject
to criticism. However, such a view is an oversimplification of the Broth-
erhood's practices. The evidence presented against the Brotherhood's
plan, as well as findings made by state courts, illustrate that the solicita-
tion was much more extensive than mere offers of advice.27
If the plan is operated in accordance with the decree of the Illinois
Supreme Court,28 solicitation will not be extensive. It may be questioned,
however, whether the decree is in fact being followed. Moreover, the
line between solicitation and investigation as conducted by the Brother-
hood may be a fine one, for even if the decree is being followed, approved
attorneys are still being recommended by the Brotherhood, they still
receive notice of claims and presumably advertise in union publications.29
To that degree, solicitation is inherent in the plan. Without the ability
to recommend counsel, the Brotherhood could only maintain a lay de-
partment to investigate accidents and advise members whether they
should sue. This would, however, destroy a primary purpose of the plan,
to provide qualified counsel. The union could provide the names of
attorneys qualified and experienced in personal injury suits. But what
peculiar ability enables the union to select from scores of attorneys who
fit this description a handful whom it deems competent? The union's
practice of recommending but one law firm to an injured member is in
fact, if not in theory, solicitation. Moreover, it is a type of solicitation
which tends to commercialize the profession. In the past it led to fee-
splitting and kickbacks. In the future, it could lead to recurrence of these
practices and worse. Lawyers might eventually bid for business, the ulti-
mate stage of commercialization.
Solicitation in the plan may be rationalized on another ground. In
Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. R., the court said:
Intemperate and unwarranted argument cannot obscure a record
which clearly shows that the purpose of the Brotherhood is a
worthy one, planned to prevent possible frauds upon its mem-
bers and to aid them in the assertion of their legal rights, and
that as a result of that purpose of the plan, Meadows, in the in-
2225 P.2d at 511.2 Doughty v. Grills, supra note 1; State v. Lush, supra note 16.
2In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, supra note 1.
2BRT v. Virginia, supra note 2, at 1119 (Clarke, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 26,
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stant case, obtained the legal services of a very able and experi-
enced lawyer and at a stipulated fee far below that usually fixed
in similar cases. 30
The premise of this argument is that the policy against solicitation is
overridden by the policy of securing fair settlement of claims. It is an
appealing argument, but is subject to the criticism above. However, on the
basis of such an argument, at least one state has exempted labor unions
from the general statute prohibiting solicitation by "runners. '31
The Brotherhood's plan has also been analogized to the retention by
liability insurers of attorneys to handle claims against their customers.32
This attempt to justify the Brotherhood's solicitation is weaker than the
others. The insurer is the real party in interest as its money will be paid
if the judgment is adverse. Moreover, the insurer attempts to settle
claims and resorts to litigation in relatively few cases. The Brotherhood,
on the other hand, is not a real party in interest, nor does it have the
power to settle claims.
The effect of the Montana Supreme Court's decision in the instant
case is to grant constitutional protection to legal aid plans where such
plans do not cause a conflict in an attorney's loyalties. This does not
indicate a complete break with tradition as courts have not indiscrimin-
ately condemned such plans in the past. Nonetheless, the decision is sig-
nificant for it may encourage the proliferation of such plans. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the Montana Supreme Court should carefully
scrutinize any plans that may come before it to exclude elements of un-
authorized practice. In so doing, the plans should be limited to investi-
gation and recommendation of attorneys. If so limited, legal aid plans
can increase the quantity and quality of legal services rendered. Such
plans are clearly subject to abuse, particularly solicitation, and courts
and Bar alike must regulate their operation.
PAUL K. KELLER.
UNINSURED MOTORIST POLICY-PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS ARISING From
INTERVENTION OF INSURER IN ACTION BY INSURED AGAINST UNINSURED
MoTORIST.-Plaintiff purchased a car insurance policy in which one clause
stipulated the insured would be protected from legal damages caused by
an accident with an uninsured motorist. A "no judgment" clause speci-
fied the insurance company would not be liable if the insured, without
the consent of the company, sued an uninsured motorist to determine the
damages. After an accident with an uninsured motorist the insurer re-
fused to pay plaintiff for an injury. Subsequently the plaintiff brought
30268 Ill. App. 364 (1932).
"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612 (1950).
32Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, supra note 1, at 521 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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